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McCrary v. Bianco, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 10 (Feb. 9, 2006)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE- PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Summary
Thomas and Rebecca McCrary (“McCrary”) appealed from a post-verdict district court
order awarding attorney fees based upon the cost shifting provisions of NRCP 68 and NRS
17.115. Dominic Bianco (“Bianco”) cross-appealed from the denial of its motion for partial
satisfaction of judgment. McCrary unsuccessfully argued that the district court erred in its
failure to consider pre-offer attorney fees and costs as part of its determination of the total
judgment for cost-shifting purposes. McCrary successfully argued that the district court erred in
not including pre-offer prejudgment interest in its comparison between the total amount awarded
and the offer of judgment, for cost-shifting purposes. Bianco unsuccessfully argued that he
should receive an offset under the repair contract. McCrary unsuccessfully argued that the offer
of judgment was invalid for lack of service and failure to file in a timely manner. The district
court’s decision was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. In this appeal, the Nevada Supreme
Court clarified the cost-shifting provisions of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 concerning offers of
judgment in civil cases. The Court held that district courts must, where applicable, and where
the offer did not preclude such comparison, include pre-offer judgment interest along with the
principal judgment amount when comparing the judgment obtained and an offer of judgment in
post-trial proceedings for relief. The Court also held that the district court properly excluded
pre-offer attorney fees and costs in making its comparison.
Factual and Procedural History
McCrary contracted with Bianco to repair insured water damage to their home. McCrary
agreed to pay Bianco $9,926.76 for his work. However, McCrary was unhappy with the work
performed, and brought suit against Bianco for damages based upon negligence and breach of
contract claims for relief. In addition, McCrary alleged that Bianco caused $75,000 in additional
damages to their home.
Bianco attempted to serve a timely pretrial offer of judgment to McCrary’s attorney. The
offer of judgment was for a principal amount of $23,999 and provided for a separate award of
statutory costs, in the event of acceptance. The offer specifically stated, “Plaintiff shall be
entitled to statutory costs of suit.” McCrary did not respond to the offer, and it was deemed
rejected.
At trial, the jury awarded McCrary a total of $15,800; $10,800 was awarded for the
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negligence claim and $5,000 was awarded for the breach of contract claim. Bianco then filed a
copy of its offer of judgment, and both parties moved for attorney’s fees. McCrary sought
recovery of fees under NRS 18.010(2) and a provision in the repair contract. Bianco sought
recovery of attorney’s fees under the cost-shifting provisions of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115. In
addition, Bianco sought an offset under the repair contract for $11,914 which was previously
paid to McCrary by their homeowner’s insurer.
The district court ultimately agreed with Bianco regarding the offer of judgment, and
awarded Bianco $15,000 in attorney’s fees plus costs of suit. Because the offer exceeded the
judgment under the district court’s analysis, the district court refused to award attorney’s fees to
McCrary. The district court determined the offer of judgment exceeded the judgment by
comparing the offer of judgment and the jury verdict. Further, the district court stated that
Bianco’s offer of judgment was reasonable in its timing and amount and that McCrary’s refusal
of the offer was grossly unreasonable. In regards to Bianco’s request for the offset, the district
court denied the request.
On appeal, McCrary challenged the fee award to Bianco and the district court’s refusal to
award attorney’s fees to them. On cross-appeal, Bianco asserted that the district court erred in
not allowing the offset as a partial satisfaction of judgment.
Discussion
McCrary asserted that the district court should have included accrued pre-offer attorney’s
fees, pre-offer costs, and pre-offer prejudgment interest as part of the judgment when it
compared the judgment with the offer. The Nevada Supreme Court stated that the district court
was correct in not considering attorney’s fees and costs, but agreed with McCrary that the
district court should have considered pre-offer prejudgment interest as part of the judgment when
it compared the judgment with the offer.
The Court discussed NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 as setting forth Nevada’s “offer of
judgment” protocols. McCrary argued that the 1998/1999 changes to NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115
validated their contention that pre-offer costs and fees may be considered as part of the judgment
for purposes of comparing the offer of judgment to the judgment awarded.
The Court stated that the 1998/1999 changes embraced a new comparison formula.
Under the new formula, in the event that the offer provided for a separate award of costs, the
district court should conduct a post-trial comparison between the amount of the offer and the
principal amount of the judgment. The Court noted that the 1999 amendments to NRS 17.115
reflected changes in the comparison formula by making costs part of the comparison when the
offer precluded a separate award of costs. The Court emphasized, however, that this was not
awarded as part of the judgment; rather, the pre-offer costs were calculated, added to the offer,
and then compared with the principal amount of the judgment. However, this analysis was not
relevant to the present case because Bianco’s offer did not preclude a separate award of costs
upon acceptance.
The Court cited its decision in Bowyer v. Taack, where the Court held that, when litigants
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are precluded from obtaining taxable costs and attorney fees under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115,
they are likewise precluded from recovering under NRS 18.010.2 The Court further held that
costs and fees could not be included as part of a judgment to determine whether the judgment
obtained exceeded the offer for relief purposes under the cost-shifting provisions.3 The Court
stated that, to this extent, when the offer provided for a separate award of costs, Bowyer
remained valid precedent, regarding exclusion of costs and fees within the comparison. The
Court emphasized that costs become part of the equation only when the offer precludes a
separate award for costs. Thus, the Court concluded that, in the present case, the district court
correctly refused to consider pre-offer fees and other costs generated by McCrary in making their
NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 comparisons.
Next, the Court discussed pre-offer prejudgment interest and offers of judgment. The
Court again referred to its decision in Bowyer. In Bowyer, the Court held that a claimant who
failed to secure a judgment greater than a previously tendered offer of judgment could not
recover awards of prejudgment interest under a court rule or statute.4 The Court further held that
prejudgment interest could not be included as part of a judgment to determine whether the
judgment exceeded the offer.5 The Court noted that this holding was consistent with Nevada
statutes, at the time of the decision.
However, in 1998, the Court amended NRCP 68 by promulgating NRCP 68(f)(1), which
limited the “loss of prejudgment interest sanction” for failure to exceed an offer of judgment to
loss of post-offer judgment interest. The Legislature amended NRS 17.115 to conform the
statute to the rule. In the present case, the Court noted that, although pre-offer prejudgment
interest was not expressly included in the 1998/1999 comparison formula, there was no reason
not to include such an award in the comparison. Thus, in the present case, the Nevada Supreme
Court held that pre-offer prejudgment interest could be added to the principal award as part of
the comparison formula.
The Court further concluded that the offer should be construed against Bianco to allow
the pre-offer prejudgment interest to be included with the judgment in comparing the judgment
with the offer because the offer was “inclusive of all claims” and noted that Bianco’s offer did
not preclude inclusion of prejudgment interest in the comparison with the offer.
Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed this matter with instructions to compute the
amount of pre-offer prejudgment interest and to add that sum to the judgment award for purposes
of comparing the judgment to the offer of judgment. If the principal award and pre-offer
prejudgment interest now exceeded the offer, Bianco should not be awarded relief under NRCP
68 and NRS 17.115. If the principal award and pre-offer prejudgment interest did not exceed the
offer of judgment, the district court could consider granting Bianco relief.
The Court discussed McCrary’s alternative argument that the offer of judgment was
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invalid for lack of service and for failure to file the offer until after the conclusion of trial. The
Court noted that Bianco had attempted service by mail but had mailed the offer to the wrong zip
code. However, the record confirmed that Bianco had sent all pleadings to the same address
with the wrong zip code, and that McCrary’s attorney had received all other pleadings sent to
this incorrect address. The district court had found that McCrary’s counsel received the offer,
and this finding was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Further, the Court stated
that failure to file the offer until after the trial was not fatal to relief under the cost-shifting
provisions of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115.
Finally, the Court discussed Bianco’s cross-appeal. The Court stated that the insurance
proceeds were only payable to Bianco in the event that there was no breach of contract. Because
the jury found that Bianco breached the contract, and neither party challenged this decision, the
Court stated that Bianco’s cross-appeal was without merit.
Conclusion
The Court determined that the district court properly refused to award or consider preoffer attorney’s fees and costs as part of its determination under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115.
However, the Court held that the district court erred in refusing to include pre-offer prejudgment
interest to the total judgment awarded in its comparison between the total judgment awarded at
trial and Bianco’s offer of judgment. Thus, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
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